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Abstract
In this paper we develop and estimate a behavioral model of inflation dynamics
with heterogeneous firms. In our stylized framework there are two groups of price
setters, fundamentalists and random walk believers. Fundamentalists are forward-
looking in the sense that they believe in a present-value relationship between inflation
and real marginal costs, while random walk believers are backward-looking, using the
simplest rule of thumb, naive expectations, to forecast inflation. Agents are allowed
to switch between these different forecasting strategies conditional on their recent
relative forecasting performance. We estimate the switching model using aggregate
and survey data. Our results support behavioral heterogeneity and the significance of
evolutionary learning mechanism. We show that there is substantial time variation in
the weights of forward-looking and backward-looking behavior. Although on average
the majority of firms use the simple backward-looking rule, the market has phases in
which it is dominated by either the fundamentalists or the random walk believers.
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1 Introduction
“Any time seems to be the right time for reflections on the Phillips curve”
Robert Solow
New Keynesian macroeconomics has greatly contributed to our understanding of inflation
dynamics by considering models with nominal rigidities and optimizing agents with rational
expectations. Despite their great popularity, New Keynesian models have also been the
object of severe criticisms. Among others, Rudd and Whelan (2005a,b) question the lack
of inflation inertia in the standard forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC).
Addressing this critique has resulted in various “hybrid” variants of the NKPC featuring
both forward and backward-looking components, which have been theoretically motivated
in several ways (see e.g., Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Christiano et al. (2005) and Gal´ı and
Gertler (1999)). Nevertheless, researchers continue to pursue more satisfying approaches to
address inflation persistence (see Romer (2011) and Madeira (2015)). Another important
criticism is the reliance of standard New Keynesian models on a strict form of rational
expectations (RE) (see among others Rudd and Whelan (2006), and Carriero (2008)).1
To address these criticisms, this paper relaxes the RE assumption and proposes a model
of inflation dynamics characterized by behavioral heterogeneous expectations. In our model
agents form subjective beliefs (forecasts) about future inflation and can decide to switch to a
different belief (forecasting rule) based on their forecasting performance. Our stylized model
includes two types of firms. The first type are fundamentalists, who believe in a present-
value relationship between inflation and real marginal costs. The second type, random
walk believers, assume instead that inflation follows a random walk and use the simplest
backward-looking rule of thumb corresponding to naive expectations (i.e., their forecast
coincides with the last available observation) to forecast future inflation. We choose this
1The assumption of RE in the formulation of inter-temporal optimization decisions has also been criti-
cized by Hendry and Mizon (2010, 2014) in the presence of unanticipated structural breaks on the grounds
that the law of iterated expectations needs not to hold when distributions shift, as integrals are taken over
different weighted intervals. Castle et al. (2014) find evidence for such shifts when fitting the hybrid NKPC
to U.S. inflation data and demonstrate that a potentially spurious outcome can arise when the NKPC is
estimated under the assumption of RE.
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specific set of forecasting rules in order to obtain a NKPC similar to the closed-form solution
of hybrid models estimated in the literature (see for example Sbordone (2005) and Rudd
and Whelan (2006)). Our specification is more general as it allows agents to switch between
rules based on their forecasting performance. Standard hybrid models as well as the purely
forward-looking and the backward-looking Phillips curves can be seen as special instances
of our general specification. Our setup is similar in spirit to the framework discussed in
Hachem and Wu (2014), where monopolistically competitive firms make decisions before
price level realizations and therefore rely on inflation forecasts. Firms have heterogeneous
forecasting rules, namely a rule which is consistent with central bank’s announcements,
and a rule consistent with a random walk, while beliefs are updated over time via social
dynamics on the basis of relative performance.2 The authors then focus on the effectiveness
of central bank communication and indentify how such communication can be tailored to
build endogenous credibility. We focus instead on the estimation of a behavioral model
with micro-founded time variation in the weights of forward- and backward-looking firms.
The results of our analysis provide empirical evidence for behavioral heterogeneity in
U.S. inflation dynamics and in survey data of professional forecasters. Moreover, the data
support the hypothesis of an endogenous mechanism relating predictors choice to their
forecasting performance. In fact, our results suggest that the degree of heterogeneity varies
considerably over time, and that the economy can be dominated temporarily by either
forward-looking or backward-looking behavior.
The main assumptions in our behavioral model, i.e., heterogeneous firms with subjective
forecasts and endogenous switching between different forecasting regimes on the basis of
prediction performances, stem from two empirical stylized facts.
First, there is an abundant literature documenting heterogeneity in inflation expecta-
tions. Noticeably, Branch (2004), Carroll (2003), Pfajfar and Santoro (2010), Madeira and
Zafar (2015), Mankiw et al. (2003) provide empirical evidence in support of heterogeneous
expectations using survey data on inflation expectations.3 Consistently with this litera-
2Arifovic et al. (2012) consider a DSGE model in which agents’ beliefs evolve through social learning
dynamics and show that the Taylor Principle is not necessary for convergence to the minimum state variable
solution under social learning.
3Heterogeneity in individual expectations has also been found in other settings. For example, Frankel
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ture we also find evidence on expectations heterogeneity using survey data on professional
inflation forecasts.
Second, when hybrid NKmodels are estimated, there is mixed evidence about the impor-
tance of the forward-looking term and the backward-looking term. For example, Gal´ı and
Gertler (1999), Sbordone (2005), Kurmann (2007) and Kleibergen and Mavroeidis (2009)
have found that the forward-looking component is more important than the backward-
looking component. On the other hand, Linde´ (2005) finds that the backward-looking
component is equally or more important, while Madeira (2014) finds that it is predom-
inant. Fuhrer (1997) and Rudd and Whelan (2006) conclude that the forward looking
component plays essentially no role in observed inflation dynamics. This mixed evidence
could be explained by the fact that there are periods when the forward-looking behavior
is predominant and periods when the backward-looking behavior is more important. In
particular, Carroll (2003) and Mankiw et al. (2003) show that inflation expectations evolve
over time in response to economic volatility. In addition, Zhang et al. (2008), Kim and
Kim (2008), Castle et al. (2014) and Hall et al. (2012) find evidence for multiple structural
breaks in the coefficients of the forward- and backward-looking terms.4 Our results pro-
vide a behavioral micro-foundation for the structural breaks observed in the relative weight
of forward-looking term in the NKPC. This is also consistent with the micro evidence of
Frankel and Froot (1991), Bloomfield and Hales (2002), Branch (2004) and Assenza et al.
(2011), among others, who show that agents’ expectations evolve in time as a response to
the past forecast errors of agents using both survey and experimental data.
Our findings have important implications for monetary policy. Standard policy rec-
ommendations based on determinacy under RE may not be a robust criterion for policy
advices in the presence of heterogeneous expectations. In fact, recent papers have shown
that multiple equilibria, periodic orbits and complex dynamics can arise in the presence of
and Froot (1990), Allen and Taylor (1990) and Ito (1990) find that financial experts use different forecasting
strategies to predict exchange rates, while Hommes et al. (2005), Adam (2007), Pfajfar and Zakelj (2014)
and Assenza et al. (2011) find evidence for heterogeneity in learning to forecast laboratory experiments
with human subjects.
4See also Stock and Watson (2007) and Groen et al. (2013) who acknowledge the possibility of the
changing time-series properties of inflation.
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dynamic predictor selection, even if the model under RE has a unique stationary solution;
see, e.g., Anufriev et al. (2013), Branch and McGough (2010), and De Grauwe (2011).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 derives a NKPC with heterogenous expec-
tations and endogenous switching dynamics. Section 3 presents the estimation results and
describes the fit of the model. Section 4 discusses the robustness of the empirical results
to alternative forecasting models. Section 5 performs out-of-sample forecasting exercises.
Section 6 provides additional evidence for the behavioral switching mechanism using survey
data on inflation expectations, while Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
This section derives a NKPC with heterogeneous, potentially nonrational expectations and
endogenous switching between forecasting strategies.
2.1 The NKPC with heterogeneous expectations
We consider a model with monopolistic competition, staggered price setting and hetero-
geneous firms. There is a continuum of firms producing differentiated goods indexed by
j ∈ [0, 1]. Each firm produces one good and has a production technology that uses labor
as the only factor of production. The demand curve for product j takes the form:
Yt(j) = Yt(Pt(j)/Pt)
−η,
where η is the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods, Yt is the
aggregator function defined as Yt = [
∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
(η−1)/ηdj]η/(η−1), and Pt is the aggregate price
level defined as Pt = [
∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−ηdj]1/(1−η). Nominal price rigidity a` la Calvo is introduced
by allowing, in every period, only a fraction (1 − ω) of the firms to set a new price. Given
that each firm hires labor from the same integrated economy-wide labor market, the prices
chosen by the firms that can re-optimize in each period will only differ because of their
subjective forecasts. Firms that reset prices maximize expected discounted profits, which
are given by
max
Pi,t(j)
Eit
∞∑
s=0
ωsQt,t+s
(
Pi,t(j)
Pt+s
−mct+s
)(
Pi,t(j)
Pt+s
)
−η
Yt+s,
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where Qt,t+s is the stochastic discount factor, mct are real marginal costs of production
and Pi,t(j) denotes the price set by a firm with subjective expectations of type i (E
i
t),
producing good j. When each firm producing a certain good j ∈ [0, 1] has a different
subjective expectation of type i ∈ [0, 1], we can without loss of generality use a single
index, say i, to denote expectations’ type and produced good.5 Therefore the term Pi,t will
denote the price of a firm with subjective expectations of type i producing good i. Defining
q∗i,t ≡ P
∗
i,t/Pt, where P
∗
i,t is the profit-maximizing price, and log-linearizing the first order
conditions of this problem around a zero inflation steady state leads to
qˆ∗i,t = (1− ωδ)m̂ct + ωδE
i
t(qˆ
∗
i,t+1 + πt+1), (1)
where δ is the time discount factor, πt ≡ pˆt− pˆt−1 is the inflation rate, and hatted variables
denote log-deviations from steady state.6 The relative average price set by optimizing firms
is given by qˆt =
∫
i
qˆ∗i,t. Log-linearizing the aggregate price level equation yields
πt =
1− ω
ω
qˆt. (2)
Under the assumption of a representative firm with rational expectations, Eqs. (1) and (2)
can be used to derive the standard NKPC:
πt = δEtπt+1 + γmct, (3)
which relates inflation, πt, to next period’s expected inflation and to real marginal costs,
mct, where γ ≡ (1−ω)(1− δω)ω
−1 and we omitted hats for notational simplicity. Deriving
an equation for inflation similar to Eq. (3) is not entirely obvious when expectations are
heterogeneous. Following Kurz et al. (2013), it is possible to aggregate the individual
pricing rules in order to obtain an aggregate supply equation of the form
πt = δE¯tπt+1 + γmct + ξt, (4)
where E¯t =
∫
i
Eit denotes the average expectation of individuals and the term ξt is defined
as ξt ≡ (1−ω)δ
∫
i
(Eitq
∗
i,t+1−E
i
tqt+1).
7 Eq. (4) shows that, in the presence of heterogeneous
5The model derivation in the presence of a discrete number of belief types, which is a particular case of
the general specification derived in this section, is outlined in Appendix A.
6See Appendix A for a detailed derivation.
7See Appendix A for details.
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expectations, inflation depends on real marginal costs, on the average forecasts of future
inflation, and on an additional term ξt representing the difference between the average
firms’ forecast of individual prices q∗i,t+1 and the average forecast of average price qt+1. In
the presence of heterogeneous agents, with possibly non-rational beliefs, there is no a-priori
reason to believe that in every period the average forecast of individual prices will coincide
with the average forecast of average price. Given that we have no data on such deviations, in
our empirical analysis we will consider ξt as part of the error term and performs diagnostic
checks on the properties of the residuals of our regression model.8 This is in line with
the ideas of, e.g., Kurz et al. (2013) and Diks and van der Weide (2005), who consider
expectations heterogeneity as a natural source of randomness.
2.2 Evolutionary selection of expectations
We assume that agents form expectations by choosing from I different forecasting rules,
and we denote by Eitπt+1 the forecast of inflation by rule i. The fraction of individuals using
the forecasting rule i at time t is denoted by ni,t. Fractions are updated in every period
according to an evolutionary fitness measure. At the beginning of every period t, agents
compare the realized relative performances of the different strategies and the fractions ni,t
evolve according to a discrete choice model with multinomial logit probabilities (see Manski
and McFadden (1981) for details), that is
ni,t =
exp(βUi,t−1)∑I
i=1 exp(βUi,t−1)
, (5)
where Ui,t−1 is the realized fitness metric of predictor i at time t − 1. The parameter
β ≥ 0 refers to the intensity of choice and reflects the sensitivity of the mass of agents to
selecting the optimal prediction strategy. Brock and Hommes (1997) proposed this model
for endogenous selection of expectation rules. We remark that Eq. (5) can also be derived
8Notice also that we cannot directly impose a structure on ξt since we will make assumptions about
how agents forecast inflation but not about how agents forecast prices. From a behavioral point of view,
forecasting prices is rather different than forecasting inflation (see e.g., Tuinstra and Wagener (2007)). In
fact, while we will make specific assumptions on inflation expectations on the basis of observable statistical
or theoretical properties of the inflation process, it is more difficult to model price expectations since in
reality agents rarely collect information or read news about prices in levels.
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from an optimisation problem under rational inattention (see Mateˇjka and McKay (2015)).
In the context of rational inattention the parameter β is inversely related to the shadow
cost of information. The key feature of Eq. (5) is that strategies with higher fitness in the
recent past attract more followers. The case β = 0 corresponds to the situation in which
differences in fitness cannot be observed, so agents do not switch between strategies and all
fractions are constant and equal to 1/I. The case β =∞ corresponds to the “neoclassical”
limit in which the fitness can be observed perfectly and in every period all agents choose
the best predictor.
2.3 A simple two-type example
In order to be able to compare our results with previous empirical works on the NKPC
featuring a forward- and a backward-looking component, we assume that agents can choose
between two forecasting rules to predict inflation, namely fundamental and random walk
beliefs. The fundamental rule is based on a present-value description of the inflation process.
When all agents have rational expectations, repeated application of Eq. (4) gives
πt = γ
∞∑
k=0
δkEtmct+k. (6)
We refer to (6) as the fundamental inflation. Fundamentalists use expression (6) to forecast
future inflation. In particular, leading (6) one-period ahead we get
πt+1 = γ
∞∑
k=1
δk−1Eft+1mct+k, (7)
where Ef denotes fundamentalists forecast. Applying the expectation operator Eft on both
sides we get
Eft πt+1 = γ
∞∑
k=1
δk−1Eft mct+k. (8)
In deriving Eq. (8) we made use of the law of iterated expectations at the individual level.
This is a reasonable and intuitive assumption which is standard in the learning literature;
see, e.g., Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Branch and McGough (2009).9
9We justify the fact that the law of iterated expectations holds at the individual level in the presence
of evolutionary switching by appealing to the learning literature which models the selection of forecasting
8
From a behavioral point of view, fundamentalists can be considered as agents who
believe in RE and use the closed form solution of the model to forecast the inflation path.
There is, however, an important difference between fundamental expectations and RE.
Fundamental expectations are not model-consistent because they do not take into account
the presence of non-rational agents. Intuitively, in a world with heterogeneous firms, model-
consistent expectations would require agents to collect an incredible amount of information
about the economy, including details about the beliefs of other agents in the market, in order
to derive the objective probability distribution of aggregate variables. More realistically,
firms in our framework only have knowledge of their objectives and of the constraints that
they face, and therefore they do not have a complete model of determination of aggregate
variables.
In order to characterize the fundamental forecast (8) we use the VAR methodology of
Campbell and Shiller (1987). Assuming that the forcing variable mct is the first variable
in the multivariate VAR
Zt = AZt−1 + ǫt, (9)
we can rewrite the sum of discounted future expectations of marginal costs (8) as
Eft πt+1 = γ
∞∑
k=1
δk−1Eft mct+k = γe
′
1(I − δAˆ(t))
−1Aˆ(t)Zt,
where e′1 is a suitably defined unit vector and Aˆ(t) is the recursive estimate of matrix A
using the information set available at time t.10 In fact, fundamentalist agents do not have
perfect foresight into the future and, in every period t, they estimate a VAR model to
produce their forecast using the information set available at time t. The coefficient matrix
is then updated in every period as new information becomes available.
The second rule, which we call random walk belief or naive expectation, takes advantage
of inflation persistence and uses a simple backward-looking forecasting strategy:
Ent πt+1 = πt−1, (10)
rules as a distinct statistical problem. Thus agents choose a forecasting model and then use that model to
solve for their optimal plan in the anticipated utility sense, as in Kreps (1998) and Sargent (1999).
10Technically, because the discounted sum of real marginal costs starts at k = 1, we measure it using
(I − δAˆ(t))
−1Aˆ(t)Zt instead of (I − δAˆ(t))
−1Zt.
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where En denotes the naive expectation operator. Notice that, although being an extremely
simple rule, the naive forecasting strategy is optimal when the stochastic process is a
random walk; hence for a near unit root process, as in the case of inflation, random walk
expectations are close to optimal.
At this point a discussion on the choice of the set of forecasting rules is warranted.
Admittedly, the fundamentalist prediction rule is built on the basis of a simple, stylized
NKPC, while there are of course more complex versions of the NKPC including e.g., in-
dexation and an autocorrelated price mark-up process (see Smets and Wouters (2007) for
an example). Moreover, given the volatility of the inflation process, one may postulate a
slightly more sophisticated naive forecasting strategy, such as an average over time of past
inflation (see Section 4). Nevertheless, the specific choice of the set of forecasting rules,
namely the fundamental rule in Eq. (8) and random walk beliefs in Eq. (10), will enable us
to compare the outcome of our analysis with the results of previous empirical works based
on the hybrid Phillips curve specification. In fact, fundamental expectations account for
the forward-looking component in the estimated closed-form solution of the hybrid NKPC.
We estimate the discounted sum of expected marginal costs using the VAR methodology as
in Sbordone (2005) and Rudd and Whelan (2006) among others, with the only difference
that, consistently with the behavioral interpretation of our model, the matrix of coefficients
in the VAR model is not estimated using observations over the full sample (i.e., informa-
tion which is not available to agents at the moment of their forecast) but it is recursively
updated as new observations become available. In Section 4 we also consider Bayesian es-
timation of matrix A as a robustness check. The backward-looking component introduced
in different ways in hybrid RE models is accounted for by the expectations of naive firms.
The main difference between traditional hybrid specifications of the NKPC and our
model is the fact that the weights assigned to forward-looking and backward-looking com-
ponent are endogenously varying over time. We assume that agents can switch between the
two predictors based on recent forecasting performance.11 Defining the absolute forecast
11In principle the switching metric should depend on the degree of price stickiness, i.e., the stickier the
prices the longer the horizon the firms should take into account. We leave this issue for future research and,
in what follows, we consider the average forecast error over the previous K periods as switching metric.
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error in the previous K periods as
FEit =
K∑
k=1
|Eit−kπt−k+1 − πt−k+1|,
with i = f, n, we can then define the evolutionary fitness measure as12
Ui,t = −
FEit∑I
i=1 FE
i
t
. (11)
The evolution of the weights of different heuristics is then given by Eq. (5). Denoting the
fraction of fundamentalists as nf,t we can summarize the full model as
πt = δ(nf,tE
f
t πt+1 + (1− nf,t)E
n
t πt+1) + γmct + ut, (12)
where ut is a composite error term including the component ξt and potential errors due to
measurement or linearization, and
Eft πt+1 = γe
′
1(I − δAˆ(t))
−1Aˆ(t)Zt
Ent πt+1 = πt−1
nf,t =
1
1 + exp
(
β
(
FEft−1−FE
n
t−1
FEft−1+FE
n
t−1
))
FEit−1 =
K∑
k=1
|Eit−k−1πt−k − πt−k|, with i = f, n .
3 Estimation results
This section describes the data and methodology used to estimate the nonlinear switching
model derived in the previous section.
3.1 Data description
We use quarterly U.S. data on the inflation rate, the output gap, the labor share of income,
and consumption-output ratio, from 1968:Q4 to 2015:Q2. The reason for the starting date
12The estimation results are robust to alternative specifications of the fitness measure. We chose relative
absolute forecast error for numerical convenience, since it restricts the support of the fitness measure to
the interval [−1, 0].
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of our sample is that observations on inflation expectations from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters, to which we compare our model-implied measure of expectations in Section
6, are available from 1968:Q4 onwards.13 Inflation is measured as log difference of the
GDP price index. Output gap is measured as quadratically detrended log real GDP. We
use labor share of income and detrended consumption-output ratio time series for nonfarm
business sector in the construction of the VAR model (9). A more detailed description of
data sources and variables definition is given in Appendix B.
3.2 The fit of the model
In this section we discuss the empirical implementation of model (12). In the “baseline”
specification (the one used in the results reported below) we use the labor share of income
as a proxy for real marginal costs (see, e.g., Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2001)
and Sbordone (2002) among others), and in Appendix F we consider the output gap as a
measure of inflationary pressure.
Baseline VAR specification
The first step concerns the choice of the baseline VAR specification to estimate the matrix
A at each point in time t, needed to construct the forecasts of fundamentalists,
Eft πt+1 = γe
′
1(I − δAˆ(t))
−1Aˆ(t)Zt.
We choose a four-lag bivariate VAR in the labor share of income (lsit) and the output
gap (yt) as our baseline specification. The optimal number of lags was chosen on the
basis of the comparison of standard information criteria for the VAR estimated over the
full sample. The Akaike information criterion, the Hannan-Quinn information criterion
and the Final Prediction Error criterion selected a number of lags equal to 4, while the
Bayesian information criterion opted for 2 lags. Given that 3 out of 4 criteria indicated 4
as the optimal lag length, we opted for a four lag baseline VAR. In Section 4 we perform
robustness checks to alternative specifications of the forecasting VAR as well as Bayesian
13We repeated our estimation exercise using samples with different starting dates and results are not
qualitatively different.
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estimation of the fundamentalist forecast. Denoting by Yt the vector of dependent variables,
Yt = [lsit, yt]
′, the vector Zt is therefore defined as Zt = [Yt, Yt−1, Yt−2, Yt−3]
′. Although
being parsimonious, our VAR specification captures about 94% of the labor share of income
volatility and the F test reports no autocorrelation in the residuals up to the 20th lag. We
initialize the VAR coefficients’ estimates using all available pre-sample data from 1947:Q2.
The matrix Aˆ(t) is then updated in every period as new information becomes available.
NLS estimation
As standard in empirical works on the NKPC, we fix the discount factor δ = 0.99, and we
select a number of K = 4 lags for measuring past performance.14 That is, if fundamentalists
(naive) have a more accurate inflation forecast over the past year, more firms will follow
the fundamentalist (naive) expectation formation rule. Model (12) is then estimated using
non-linear least squares (NLS). Table 1 presents the results and diagnostic checks of the
residuals are reported in Appendix C.
Table 1: NLS estimates of model (12)
Parameter β γ
Estimate 5.040∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
Std. error 1.641 0.0002
R2 from Inflation Equation 0.82
Notes : Standard errors are computed using White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix esti-
mator (HCCME). ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
All coefficients have the correct sign and are significant at the 1% level. The estimate
of coefficient γ is in line with most estimates in the literature, while the positive sign and
the significance of the intensity of choice parameter β implies that agents switch towards
14From a behavioral point of view it seems a sensible choice to pick K = 4 for quarterly data, meaning
that the fitness measure takes an average of the forecast errors over the past year. Experimentation with
different values of K shows that our results are robust to the choice of the number of lags in the performance
measure.
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the better performing forecasting rule, based on its past performance.15 The time series of
inflation predicted by model (12) for the estimated values of β and γ is plotted in Fig. 1,
as dashed line, versus the actual series (solid line).16 Overall the predicted inflation path
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
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fla
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Figure 1: Actual versus predicted inflation
tracks the behavior of actual inflation quite well (the R2 from inflation equation (12) is
about 0.82, see Table 1).
Our results are, in some respects, similar to findings obtained in previous empirical
works. In particular, Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2005) find that models derived
from the assumption of heterogeneous price setting behavior are capable of fitting the
level of inflation quite well. However, Rudd and Whelan (2005a) and Rudd and Whelan
(2006) show that this good fit reflects the substantial role that these models still allow for
lagged inflation, and that forward-looking components play no discernable empirical role
in determining inflation.
15The order of magnitude of β is more difficult to interpret as it is conditional on the functional form of
the performance measure U .
16The series are in deviation from the mean.
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Our NKPC specification allows for time-varying weights assigned to fundamentalists
and naive price setters. Having estimated model (12), we are now ready to assess the
relative importance over time of forward-looking versus backward-looking components in
inflation dynamics. Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of the weight of the forward-
looking component nf .
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the weight nf
Mean Median Max Min St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 1st order AC
0.353 0.276 0.924 0.019 0.282 0.418 1.720 0.887
On average, the majority of agents use the simple backward-looking rule (with average
fraction 1 − 0.35 = 0.65). However, the spread between the minimum and the maximum
indicates that the market can be dominated by either forward-looking or backward-looking
agents. Moreover the autocorrelation of the series nf , about 0.89, indicates that agents
do not change their strategy quickly, suggesting a relatively high degree of inertia in the
updating process.
Fig. 2 shows the time series of the fraction of fundamentalists, i.e., the forward-looking
component in our NKPC specification, the time series of the distance of actual inflation
from the fundamental and the random walk forecasts, and a scatter plot of the fraction of
fundamentalists against the relative forecast error of the naive rule. It is clear from this
figure that the fraction of fundamentalists varies considerably over time with periods in
which it is close to 0.5 and other phases in which it is close to either one of the extremes 0 or
1. For example, immediately after the oil crisis of 1973, the proportion of fundamentalists
drops almost to 0. Soon after the difference between inflation and fundamental value
reaches its peak in 1974:Q4, the estimated weight of the forward-looking component shoots
back up to about 0.6. During the second oil crisis, inflation was far above the fundamental,
causing more and more agents to adopt a simple backward-looking rule to forecast inflation.
Our findings suggest that, in reaction to large shocks pushing inflation away from the
fundamental, a large share of agents adopt random walk beliefs causing self-fulfilling high
inflation persistence.
This result is in line with the analysis of Branch and Evans (2016) showing that innova-
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Figure 2: First (top) panel: Time series of the fraction of fundamentalists nf,t. Second
panel: Distance between actual inflation and fundamental forecast. Third panel: Distance
between actual inflation and naive forecast. Fourth (bottom) panel: Scatter plot of the weight
nf,t versus the relative forecast error of the naive rule.
tions to inflation can lead agents adaptively learning in the economy to temporarily believe
that inflation follows a random walk. Fig. 2 shows that the fundamentalists dominated the
economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, while in the late stage of the Great Moderation
(from 1992 until 2004), inflation stayed continuously well below the fundamental, causing
the weight of random walk believers to increase. This result is consistent with the findings
of Stock and Watson (2007), and Madeira and Zafar (2015) who show that the statistical
capability of the last observed inflation for the next year inflation forecasts increased sub-
stantially in the period 1990-2005. We observe from Fig. 2 that in the aftermath of the
global financial crisis of 2007/8 nf increases, reaching peaks of about 0.9. Moreover, the
heterogeneity of inflation expectations has increased since 2006, a finding consistent with
the results of Madeira and Zafar (2015). This could be explained perhaps by the greater
uncertainty due to the economic crisis. The bottom panel of Fig. 2 presents a scatter plot
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of the relative forecast error of the random walk rule, (FEn−FEf )/(FEn+FEf ), versus
the fraction of fundamentalist agents, nf . Due to the positive estimated value of β, this
line slopes upwards, such that a more accurate fundamentalist forecast results in a higher
weight nf . The S shape is induced by the logit function in Eq. (5).
The analysis conducted in this section shows that the evolutionary learning model fits
the data well. The positive sign and the significance of the intensity of choice parameter,
β, imply that the endogenous mechanism that relates predictors choice to past perfor-
mance is supported by the data. We also find that the ability of the discounted sum of
expected future marginal costs values to predict the empirical inflation process varies con-
siderably over time. In fact the spread between the minimum and the maximum value of
nf , i.e., the fraction of fundamentalists, shows that the economy can be dominated by either
forward-looking or backward-looking behavior. Moreover, even though the market is, on
average, dominated by agents using a simple heuristic to predict inflation, fundamentalists,
or forward-looking components, still have a significant impact on inflation dynamics.
3.3 Specification tests and model selection
In order to assess the validity of our baseline heuristic switching model, which will be
denoted by HSM, we test it against four alternative specifications: a model with hetero-
geneous agents and exogenous estimated fixed weights (nf,t ≡ n̂f ), which is similar to
the hybrid NKPC estimated by Rudd and Whelan (2006) and Sbordone (2005), and it
is denoted by M1; a model with homogeneous fundamentalists agents (nf,t ≡ 1), which
resembles the RE closed form solution of the standard NKPC without backward-looking
component, denoted by M2;
17 a model with homogeneous naive agents (nf,t ≡ 0), which
17In fact, in the presence of homogeneous firms we have that ξt = 0 and, substituting the fundamental
forecast in Eq. (4), we get pit = δγ
∑
∞
k=1 δ
k−1Eft mct+k +γmct = γ
∑
∞
k=0 δ
kEft mct+k which corresponds to
the inflation path implied by the RE closed form solution in Eq. (6), when the discounted sums of current
and future expected marginal costs are estimated in the same way. The difference between the model with
only fundamentalists and the standard model under RE is the fact that typically in the latter the matrix of
coefficients in the VAR model (9) is estimated using the full sample, i.e., Aˆ(T ), while consistently with our
behavioral model, fundamentalists only use available information in each period implying that the matrix
of coefficients A is estimated period by period, i.e., Aˆ(t). The outcome of the test reported in Table 3 below
17
recalls the backward-looking Phillips curve and it is denoted by M3; a static model with
heterogeneous agents in which we let β = 0 (nf,t ≡ 0.5), which is similar to the model of
Fuhrer and Moore (1995), denoted by M4. Given that, with the exception of model M4
which obtains by setting β = 0, the competing models are nonnested, we will use nonnested
hypothesis testing procedures. In particular, we construct the P test for the adequacy of
our nonlinear specification with endogenous switching in explaining inflation dynamics (null
hypothesis) against the alternative specifications mentioned above. Nonnested hypotheses
tests are appropriate when rival hypotheses are advanced for the explanation of the same
economic phenomenon. We will follow the procedure described in Davidson and MacKin-
non (1981) and Davidson and MacKinnon (2009) and compute a heteroskedasticity-robust
P test of HSM against the alternatives M1, M2, M3, and M4. We report the results of the
test in Table 3 and refer the reader to Davidson and MacKinnon (2009), p. 284 and p. 669,
for details on the construction of the heteroskedasticity-robust test. The first two rows of
Table 3: Paired nonnested hypotheses tests and Bayesian Information Criteria
HSM M1 M2 M3 M4
HSM vs. Mc – 0.175 0.450 0.180 0.959
Mc vs. HSM – 0.020 0.000 0.001 0.034
BIC -1690 −1681 −1584 −1394 −1675
Notes: The first row reports p-values from P tests of HSM model against each model Mc (c ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}).
The second row reports p-values from P tests of each model Mc (c ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) against HSM model. The
third row reports the BIC for all models (best model shown in bold).
Table 3 report the results of paired nonnested tests in which we test the benchmark HSM
against M1, M2, M3, and M4 (first line of the table), and we test each M1, M2, M3, and M4
model against the HSM model (second line of the table).18 The first row of Table 3 shows
does not change if we substitute model M2 with the actual RE closed form solution. Moreover, in Section 4
we estimate our behavioral model by giving the fundamentalists the same “informational advantage” as in
standard models with RE, hence using the full sample to estimate the VAR. The qualitative results in Table
3 are not altered when considering a behavioral model in which the fundamentalists have an informational
advantage as in RE models.
18For completeness, we also compared the HSM model to the nested static model M4 using a likelihood
ratio test. We rejected the null of a restricted static model at the 1% level.
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that we never reject, with 95% confidence level, our baseline switching model (HSM) when
tested against all alternative models (M1, M2, M3, and M4). In other words, there is no
statistically significant evidence of departure from the null hypothesis, i.e., adequacy of the
nonlinear switching model, in the direction of these alternative explanations of inflation
dynamics. On the contrary, the second row of Table 3 shows that we reject each of the
alternative models when tested against the switching model.19
The results of the nonnested hypotheses tests show that the data support our model
of inflation dynamics and provide evidence in favor of the switching model when tested
against alternative models of the inflation process. However, since nonnested hypotheses
tests are designed as specification tests, we complete the analysis by reporting the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) for model selection in the last row of Table 3. The BIC chooses
the baseline switching model as the best model among all competing models, confirming
the results of the nonnested hypotheses tests.
In Appendix D we test our baseline model against a set of alternative models in which a
representative agent forms forecasts using a constant gain algorithm.20 We consider three
different specifications for the perceived law of motions used by the agents to forecast
future inflation (see Appendix D for details). Both the nonnested hypotheses tests and the
comparison of BICs are in favor of the switching model, a result that is in line with the
findings reported in this section.
4 Robustness analysis
In this section we address the issue of how sensitive our results are to alternative speci-
fications of the forecasting rules of both fundamentalists and random walk believers. In
order to investigate the robustness of our results to alternative specifications of the fun-
damentalist VAR forecasting model, we extend our baseline specification by adding lagged
19For the sake of completeness, we also test the joint significance of the alternative models against our
benchmark nonlinear switching model. The resulting F -statistic is 4.828, which leads to the acceptance of
the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of alternative models M1, M2, M3, and M4 against HSM (p-value
χ2(4) = 0.305).
20We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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inflation (πt−1) and consumption-output ratio (ct/yt).
21 These variables have been used in
the VAR specifications considered by Rudd and Whelan (2005a) and Sbordone (2002). For
each of the VARs considered in this section, the number of lags has been chosen optimally
by comparing standard information criteria as in Section 3.2 and picking the number of
lags selected by the majority of the criteria.
Table 4: Estimation results using alternative VARs for labor share of income
VAR specification
Recursive Aˆ(t) (1–3) Full sample Aˆ(T ) (4–6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

lsit
yt




lsit
yt
pit−1




lsit
yt
pit−1
ct/yt



lsit
yt




lsit
yt
pit−1




lsit
yt
pit−1
ct/yt


β 5.041∗∗∗ 5.611∗∗∗ 5.352∗∗∗ 7.030∗∗∗ 9.265∗∗∗ 8.957∗∗∗
(1.641) (1.753) (1.655) (2.525) (1.802) (3.175)
γ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0007)
R2 from Inflation Equation
0.82 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.79 0.81
Notes : lsit ≡ labor share, yt ≡ output gap, pit−1 ≡ (past) inflation, ct/yt ≡ detrended consumption-output
ratio. Lag length (li) in VAR specifications (i = 1, . . . , 3): l1 = 4, l2 = l3 = 2. Standard errors are
computed using White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator (HCCME). ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Columns 1–3 report estimates for coefficient matrix Aˆ(t)
updated in every period, while columns 4–6 report estimates for coefficient matrix Aˆ(T ), estimated over
the full sample.
Columns 1–3 of Table 4 report estimation results from alternative VAR forecasting
models for the labor share of income, with coefficient matrix Aˆ(t) updated by fundamen-
21We use pit−1 in the construction of the VAR to be consistent with the information set of fundamentalist
firms in the model. In fact, as standard in learning models, current values of endogenous variables are
not observable at time t because they depend on the heterogeneous beliefs in the economy which are not
known to the individual firm.
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talists in every period as new information becomes available. As shown in Table 4, the
point estimates and significance of the coefficients β and γ do not change substantially. As
a further robustness check, in columns 4–6 we repeat the exercise and estimate the VAR
coefficient matrix over the full sample, i.e., Aˆ(T ), in the spirit of standard RE models. The
results support behavioural heterogeneity and switching behavior even in the presence of
such “informational advantage” for fundamentalists.
We also estimate our behavioral model using different BVARs in the estimation of the
fundamentalist forecast. We consider two different BVAR specifications: a BVAR with
two variables, namely lsit and yt, with four lags, and a BVAR with four variables, namely
lsit, yt, πt−1 and ct/yt with four lags. For each BVAR we consider three different prior
specifications, i.e., a Sims-Zha Normal Wishart prior, a Minnesota prior, and a simpler
Normal Wishart prior (see Appendix E for details on the specification of the priors’ hyper-
parameters). The results are reported in Table E.2, Appendix E. The estimates of both
coefficients β and γ are positive and statistically significant and the results are robust to
variations in the priors’ hyper-parameters.
As an additional robustness check, we estimate the switching model assuming that the
naive predictor is given by the average of the past four lags of inflation along the lines of
Atkeson and Ohanian (2001). The naive forecasting rule thus reads as follows:
Ent πt+1 =
1
4
4∑
k=1
πt−k.
This specification is justified on the grounds that quarterly inflation data are volatile and
therefore it is plausible that even naive agents use some average over time of past inflation.
The results in Table E.3, Appendix E report once again positive and significant estimates
of the parameters β and γ.
Overall, the robustness checks performed in this section suggest that our analysis is
robust to different VAR forecasting models for the driving variable in the inflation process
and to alternative naive forecasting rules. In Appendix F we investigate the sensitivity of
our results to alternative measures of marginal costs. We re-estimate our model using an
output gap measure as the driving variable in the inflation process and we find significant
evidence for the behavioral switching mechanism.
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5 Out-of-sample forecast
In this section we compare the point forecast accuracies of our heuristic switching baseline
model (HSM) and models M1 (nf,t ≡ nˆf ), M2 (nf,t ≡ 1), M3 (nf,t ≡ 0) as described in Sec-
tion 3.3 to a benchmark model for inflation forecasts, namely the Unobserved Components
model with Stochastic Volatility (UC-SV) of Stock and Watson (2007) (see Appendix G for
details). In the following we construct iterated point forecasts from these models based on
the recursive window scheme (the estimates are updated at each forecast origin using all
available information).22 In forming the first forecast, we estimate the models using data
from 1968:Q4 (consistently with the analysis in the previous sections) to 1978:Q4 and then
form forecasts for horizons (quarters) h = 1, . . . , 16. We then move forward one quarter
and estimate the model from 1968:Q4 to 1979:Q1, and form forecasts for horizons 1-16.
We continue in a similar fashion through the rest of the sample.23
Table 5 presents the ratios of the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) of the models
HSM, M1, M2, and M3 relative to the RMSE of the UC-SV model for 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 12
and 16-quarters forecast horizons. In order to assess the statistical significance of the
differences in the accuracy of the point forecasts in finite sample, we report the results
of the Diebold-Mariano test for equal MSE, taking the UC-SV model as the benchmark.
Following the recommendation of Clark and McCracken (2013), the Diebold-Mariano t-
tests are computed using the adjusted variance developed in Harvey et al. (1997).24 In
order to evaluate the statistical significance, the tests are compared with the asymptotic
critical values from the standard normal distribution.25
It is well-known that relatively simple statistical model or non-structural models such
as the UC-SV model win forecast competitions against the different variants of structural
Phillips curve models. However, as it can be seen from Table 5, when compared to the
22The point forecasts of the UC-SV model are computed as the median of the posterior distribution.
23Details on the construction of iterated and direct forecasts of the HSM model are reported in Appendix
G, which also reports starting values and prior specification of the UC-SV model.
24We have also considered the pre-whitened quadratic spectral estimator of Andrews and Monahan
(1992) and obtained similar results.
25Since the UC-SV model is the benchmark model, the HSM baseline, M1, M2, M3 are non nested under
the null of equal forecast accuracy in finite sample.
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UC-SV model, the null of equal accuracy is not rejected for the HSM and M1 models for
any of the forecast horizons considered. On the contrary, the null of equal accuracy in
finite sample is rejected for 1 and 2-quarters ahead forecasts for the M2 model respectively
at the 1% and 5%, while for the M3 model the null of equal accuracy is rejected at 1% at
8, 12 and 16-quarters ahead forecasts.26
Table 5: Ratios of RMSE (iterated forecasts, recursive scheme) to UC-SV model
Model h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4 h = 8 h = 12 h = 16
HSM 1.029 1.009 1.023 1.020 1.018 0.986 0.968
M1 1.056 1.119 1.132 1.137 1.081 0.889 0.750
M2 1.943
∗∗∗ 1.740∗∗ 1.516 1.318 0.909 0.612 0.529
M3 1.020 1.045 1.037 1.088 1.162
∗∗∗ 1.229∗∗∗ 1.252∗∗∗
Notes : For HSM matrix Aˆ(t) is estimated using the baseline VAR Yt = [lsit, yt] with 4 lags; We use the
Diebold-Mariano test for equal MSE applied to the forecast of each model relative to the benchmark UC-
SV. Differences in accuracy that are statistically significant are denoted by ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗, referring respectively
to significance at 10%, 5%, 1%. The Diebold-Mariano test statistics are computed using the adjusted
variance developed in Harvey et al. (1997).
The Diebold-Mariano statistic tests for equal forecast accuracy on average over the
whole sample. In contrast, the Giacomini and Rossi (2010) fluctuations test focuses on
the forecast accuracy at each point in time. In Appendix G we present the results of
the Giacomini and Rossi (2010) fluctuations test (see Fig. G.2) for equal accuracy at each
point in time of the HSM, M1, M2 and M3 models relative to the benchmark UC-SV model.
The test reveals some instabilities in the relative forecast accuracy of all the models which
makes it difficult to conclude that one model is the best. In particular, Fig. G.2 (panel
(a)) indicates that the HSM baseline model has more accurate forecasts than the UC-SV
model for most of the 1980s, less accurate in the period following the 2007/8 financial crisis,
and equal accuracy during the 1990s, 2000s and the recent years. Finally, in Appendix G
we present rolling RMSEs (see Fig. G.1) using a weighted centered 15-quarter window (as
26The conclusions are similar when we use iterated point forecasts with a rolling window scheme (for the
UC-SV, M1, M2, M3 models) and direct point forecasts, both with recursive and rolling window scheme
(for M1, M2, M3 models, see Tables G.1, G.2 and G.3 in Appendix G).
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in Stock and Watson (2009)). In particular, Fig. G.1 (panel (a)) shows that the baseline
forecasts outperform the UC-SV model forecasts over most of the 1980s. Over the 1990s
and 2000s the baseline HSM and UC-SV models forecasts are similar, while in the aftermath
of the 2007/8 financial crisis the UC-SV model had smaller RMSE than the baseline HSM.
6 Survey data
So far we have presented evidence for behavioral heterogeneity and endogenous switching
mechanism using macroeconomic data. In this section we focus on survey data on inflation
expectations. Although a thorough analysis of micro-level data is beyond the scope of the
paper, we provide some evidence for the behavioral mechanism described in the previous
sections using observed average inflation expectations. Our measure of observed inflation
expectations is given by the one-quarter ahead average expectations for the GDP defla-
tor obtained from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). Following Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2012), Milani (2011) and Del Negro and Eusepi (2011) among others, we
focus on SPF data because predictions of professional forecasters are consistently available
at a quarterly frequency and such predictions, unlike the Michigan Survey of households
forecasts, refer to explicitly defined variables such as the GDP deflator, and are therefore
directly comparable with the measure of expectations extracted from model (12).27 SPF
data are available from 1968:Q4 and we compute expected inflation, denoted as Espft πt+1
as the log difference of the expected GDP deflator for the next quarter and the current
quarter, averaged across forecasters.
Before proceeding with the analysis, a discussion on measurement issues with inflation
expectations is warranted. Typically forecasters in the field only have the latest vintage
of data available, while the econometrician often uses the final data vintage. Moreover,
SPF forecasters provide their forecasts in the middle of the quarter and therefore they only
have partial information about the current quarter. Although the issue of data revisions
27Branch (2004) fits a model with similar dynamic selection among three predictors, namely naive,
adaptive and VAR expectations and costs associated with the adoption of each predictor, to the Michigan
survey data on inflation expectations. The author finds support for switching behavior between different
rules depending on the relative mean squared errors of the predictors.
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represents an important challenge, we do not pursue it in this paper.28 Therefore, in
order to facilitate comparison with the results obtained in the previous sections, following
Canova and Gambetti (2010) and Del Negro and Eusepi (2011) among others, we use
inflation expectations together with revised data for macroeconomic variables and obtain
the benchmark results of this session under the assumption that observed expectations are
formed using an information set which includes the current quarter (see also Clark and
Davig (2011) for a discussion on real-time data issues and data revisions in VARs.).
As a first exercise, we compare average SPF inflation expectations, i.e., Espft πt+1, with
the time series of average expected inflation implied by model (12) (as estimated in Table
1), i.e., E¯tπt+1 = nf,tE
f
t πt+1 + (1− nf,t)E
n
t πt+1. Fig. 3 plots the two time series.
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
In
fla
tio
n 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
SPF expectations
HSM expectations
Figure 3: Inflation expectations: SPF data and HSM prediction
Fig. 3 shows that the model-implied expectations can reproduce, at least qualitatively,
28The “Real Time Data Set for Macroeconomists”, made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, reports vintages of the major macroeconomic data available at quarterly intervals in real
time. However, the dataset does not include the labor share of income, while other variables are not
available for the full sample considered in this paper.
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the pattern of SPF expectations data. The correlation between the two series is 0.91.29
As a second exercise, we estimate the heuristic switching model directly on SPF average
data and compare the results with the estimates in Table 1. In particular, we estimate the
model
Espft πt+1 = nf,tE
f
t πt+1 + (1− nf,t)E
n
t πt+1 + εt
Eft πt+1 = γe
′
1(I − δAˆ(t))
−1Aˆ(t)Zt
Ent πt+1 = πt−1
nf,t =
1
1 + exp
(
β
(
FEft−1−FE
n
t−1
FEft−1+FE
n
t−1
))
FEit−1 =
K∑
k=1
|Eit−k−1πt−k − πt−k|, with i = f, n,
using the baseline VAR specification. The estimation results are reported in Table 6.
Table 6: NLS estimates of HSM with SPF data
Parameter β γ
Estimate 1.995∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
Std. error 0.355 0.0002
R2 from SPF Equation 0.83
Notes : Standard errors are computed using White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix esti-
mator (HCCME). ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
The estimate of parameter γ using SPF data is positive and statistically significant,
with a magnitude comparable to the estimate in Table 1. Although the estimate of pa-
rameter β is slightly smaller than the estimate obtained using aggregate data, suggesting
slower switching dynamics in SPF data, we do observe a positive and significant β. This
means that survey data support the hypothesis of dynamic switching that depends on past
forecasting errors. The time series of nf,t extracted using both macroeconomic and SPF
data are displayed in Fig. 4.
29For the sake of completeness, we also compare average SPF expectations data with expectations paths
generated by models in which nf,t = 0, 1. The R
2 (log-likelihood) for the HSM model is 0.83 (894) and for
the models with nf,t = 0, 1 they are respectively 0.79 (874) and 0.15 (742).
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Finally, in order to provide some evidence that the time-variation in the weights ex-
tracted by model (12) is associated with changes in the behavior of actual forecasters,
we perform the following exercise. First, we estimate a model with constant weights of
fundamentalists and random walk believers using SPF data, i.e., nf,t = nf . Second, we
test for unknown multiple structural breaks in the estimated weight nˆf using the sequen-
tial Sup-Wald test (robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity) proposed by Bai and
Perron (1998). We first test for zero breaks against the alternative of one break. If the
null is rejected, we then test for an additional break in the subsample before and after
the first break, and so on until the alternative of an additional break is not rejected. The
Bai and Perron procedure detected the following break dates: 1972:Q4, 1974:Q4, 1983:Q1,
1993:Q1, 1999:Q1, 2005:Q3, 2009:Q4, 2011:Q2. The break dates are all significant at 1%,
except for the breaks in 2005:Q3 and 1993:Q1 which are significant at 5%. Third, we
plot in Fig. 4 the estimated breaks against the time series of the weight nf,t extracted by
model (12) from macroeconomic data. The results displayed in Fig. 4 show that indeed the
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Figure 4: Estimated structural breaks on SPF data (vertical dashed lines) and HSM weights
extracted from aggregate data (solid line) and SPF data (dashed line).
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estimated structural changes in survey data on actual forecasting behavior correspond to
large movements in the weights of forward- and backward-looking terms in the NKPC. For
example, the estimated breaks in 1972:Q4 and 1974:Q4 correspond to a phase in which the
weight of fundamentalists oscillates from about 0.1 to 0.8, and then back to about 0.05;
or, as another example, the estimated breaks in 1983:Q1 and 1993:Q1 match respectively
a change of the weight of forward-looking behavior from around 0.1 to 0.9 and from 0.8 to
0.1.
Overall, the results presented in this section support the idea of an heuristic switching
mechanism based on past performance in survey data on actual inflation expectations.
Moreover, the fluctuations in weights of forward- vs. backward-looking behavior extracted
by the model using macroeconomic data seem to be matched by some changes in the
predicting behavior of actual forecasters.
7 Conclusions
Over the past few decades it has become accepted that the purely forward-looking NKPC
cannot account for the degree of inflation inertia observed in the data. In response, the
profession has increasingly adopted hybrid models in which lagged inflation is allowed to
have an explicit role in pricing behavior. This reformulation of the basic sticky-price model
has recently provoked a heated debate as to the extent of forward- versus backward-looking
behavior, with little consensus after years of investigation. Most of the empirical studies on
the topic take the distribution of heterogeneous pricing behavior as fixed and exogenously
given. Recent works on structural stability in short-run inflation dynamics in the U.S.
have provided statistical evidence of multiple structural breaks in the relative weights of
forward- and backward-looking firms. Moreover, empirical studies based on survey data
as well as experimental data, provided evidence that the proportions of heterogeneous
forecasters evolve over time as a reaction to past forecast errors. In the light of this empirical
evidence, we have proposed a model of monopolistic price setting with nominal rigidities
and endogenous evolutionary switching between different forecasting strategies according
to their relative past performances. Importantly, in light of the recent criticisms to model-
consistent RE in the NKPC on both theoretical and empirical grounds, heterogeneous firms
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in our model hold optimizing behavior given their subjective expectations of future inflation.
In our stylized framework, fundamentalist firms believe in a present-value relationship
between inflation and real marginal costs, as predicted by standard RE models, while
naive firms use a simple rule of thumb to forecast future inflation. Although with a different
behavioral interpretation, our measure of fundamental expectation is similar to the measure
of forward-looking expectations in commonly estimated RE models, while the expectations
of random walk believers account for the lagged value of inflation in the hybrid specification
of the NKPC. The difference with traditional tests of sticky-price models arises from the
introduction of time-varying weights and endogenous switching dynamics.
We estimated our behavioral model of inflation dynamics on quarterly U.S. inflation
data from 1968:Q4 to 2015:Q2. Our estimation results show statistically significant behav-
ioral heterogeneity and substantial time variation in the weights of forward- and backward-
looking price setters. The data gave considerable support for the parameter restrictions
implied by our theory. In particular, the intensity of choice was found to be positive, indi-
cating that agents switch towards the better performing rule according to its past perfor-
mance, and inflation was positively affected by real marginal costs. Moreover, the analysis
of survey data on inflation expectations provides additional evidence for the behavioral
switching mechanism.
Our results suggest that large shocks, such as the oil crises, pushed inflation away from
the fundamental, triggering therefore a large share of agents to adopt random walk beliefs.
Moreover, during the Great Moderation, forecasts obtained in accordance to a Phillips
curve relationship between inflation and real activity, did not perform better than simple
univariate models, such as the naive rule.
Our findings have important monetary policy implications. Recent papers have shown
that multiple equilibria and complex dynamics can arise in New Keynesian models under
dynamic predictor selection, even if the model under RE has a unique stationary solution.
Given the statistical evidence found in our empirical results for heterogeneous expectations
and evolutionary switching, determinacy under RE may not be a robust recommendation
and monetary policy should be designed to account for potentially destabilizing heteroge-
neous expectations.
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